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A B S T R A C T
Cross-border electricity interconnections are important for ensuring energy exchange and addressing undesirable events such as power outages and blackouts. This
paper assesses the performance of interconnection lines by measuring their impacts on the main reliability and vulnerability indicators of interconnected power
systems. The reliability study is performed using the sequential Monte Carlo simulation technique, while the vulnerability assessment is carried out by proposing a
cascading failures methodology. The conclusions obtained show that highly connected infrastructures have simultaneously high reliability and limited robustness,
which suggests that both approaches show different operational characteristics of the power system. Nevertheless, an appropriate increase in the number and
capacity of the interconnections can help to improve both security parameters of the power supply. Seven case studies are performed based on the IEEE RTS-96 test
system. The results can be used to help transmission system operators better understand the behaviour and performance of electrical networks.
1. Introduction
Power systems are increasingly large and complex due to the rapid
development of modern societies, which have created innumerable
challenges of analysis for infrastructure operators. This prolific growth
has been accompanied by the construction of new plants and assets to
maintain the levels of reliability and security of the electricity grid.
More recently, in the member countries of the European Union, this
progress has also included improvements in cross-border electricity
interconnections to increase the electricity supply and integrate more
renewable energy sources into the energy markets [1]. The merging of
two or more electricity infrastructures has created numerous benefits
for the economy and the population, since a country can rely on
neighbours for importing the necessary electricity and becoming better
equipped to manage undesirable events, such as weather events, fail-
ures and blackouts. Additionally, the need to build new power plants is
reduced, and the optimal management of renewable energies is fa-
cilitated, among many other factors [1–3]. Therefore, connecting iso-
lated power systems is essential for supply security.
In the case of coupled electrical infrastructures, a failure within one
of the systems has the potential to propagate throughout the network.
For example, the European blackout in 2006 was due to a routine
disconnection of a single power line in northwest Germany, which
caused more than 15 million customers in five countries of the Union
for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) to be
without electricity for approximately two hours [4]. These critical in-
frastructures must operate safely and reliably.
These aspects highlight the importance of managing these risks and
vulnerabilities. Traditionally, the risk management approach that en-
sures proper operating conditions of electrical infrastructure has pre-
vailed since it identifies the most potential threats and hazards.
However, in risk management, two complementary approaches can be
considered - high-probability but low-impact events or low-probability
but high-impact events [5–7]. The first class of events corresponds to
the reliability approach, since it considers n-1 and n-2 contingencies,
while the second class of events corresponds to the vulnerability ap-
proach since it considers n-k contingencies [8].
This article considers that both perspectives of risk analysis should
be integrated within a unified decision framework to compensate for
the limitations of a single approach in the study of cross-border inter-
connections. The reliability analysis, as the focus of risk management in
power networks, should be complemented with a vulnerability analysis
to improve the planning of the system's expansion and better under-
stand the structural performance of the networks. Feeder links can
improve the levels of reliability but fail to achieve improvements in the
levels of vulnerability, or they can improve the vulnerability but si-
multaneously worsen the reliability. In these situations, the construc-
tion of new connecting lines must consider both approaches to improve
the performance and behaviours of the interconnected systems.
Reliability can be defined as the capacity of the power system to
continuously satisfy demand with an acceptable level of quality or
perform a required function in given environmental and operational
conditions for a given period [9–12]. Other similar definitions are
provided in [13, 14]. Several approaches can be employed to conduct
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reliability studies, from analytical models to Monte Carlo probabilistic
models. The latter is a more flexible methodology than analytical
models but requires more calculation time, especially when operating
conditions and complex system states are considered. The reliability of
electrical infrastructure is measured in terms of the indices presented in
Section 3.
Reliability assessments are based on the probabilistic estimation of
the failures and the negative quantification of these events or incidents
[15–17]. These estimates are purely quantitative since they are con-
structed considering the estimated probabilities, which can generate
some uncertainty in the final results [18, 19]. Some authors argue that
risk management should also incorporate concepts such as robustness
and resilience to further improve the security of power networks [15,
18]. In this sense, the vulnerability approach is the methodology with
the best characteristics to address these concepts.
Vulnerability is the degree with which an electrical network de-
grades due to a loss of functioning of its elements after an attack or
failure [20, 21]. Vulnerability can also be defined as the inability of an
infrastructure to withstand variations in voltages and the effects of
failures [22]. The term robustness, complementary to the term vul-
nerability, is used to define the ability of a system to maintain, at least
partially, the electrical supply in the case of unforeseen events or in-
cidents [23]. For example, the single interruption of a transmission line
can cause the overload of other lines, which increases the likelihood
that other assets will fail and cause a system-wide failure [24]. Unlike
the reliability approach, the vulnerability approach does not consider
the probabilities of failures or threats but rather quantifies the effect or
impact of the disturbances on the structural performance of the network
to identify potential threats. Vulnerability is an inherent characteristic
of power systems.
Few documents discuss the two approaches, and the results are
contrasted in parallel [25–27], that is, systematic comparisons to
identify how the two approaches can be applied in a complementary
manner are lacking.
This article addresses the lack of comparative studies analysing the
impact of cross-border interconnections with reliability and vulner-
ability assessment approaches. The objective is to show, using empirical
evidence, that feeder links have an important role in supply security but
simultaneously have the potential to cause disturbances in a joint net-
work since they can propagate failures or disruptions [2]. The network
selected to carry out this study is based on the well-known IEEE RTS-96
test system, from which seven different case studies are extracted [28].
This system is chosen as it is a sufficiently small network for performing
a large number of studies with a reasonable solution time but suffi-
ciently detailed to reflect the actual complexities involved in reliability
and vulnerability approaches. This system includes main generation
and transmission facilities in a simple but representative model of real
interconnected infrastructures. The premise is to illustrate, as much as
possible, different technologies and configurations in power systems
[28].
Two studies are executed using the procedures and provisions
identified in their respective fields of research. The reliability approach
is performed using the sequential Monte Carlo simulation technique,
and the vulnerability approach is executed using a cascading failure
procedure [29–31]. The discussion seeks to enrich the scientific debate
by demonstrating that results from the reliability and vulnerability
analyses can be combined and discussed in parallel and show how these
approaches can provide complementary information about the inter-
connected infrastructure.
The remainder of this document is organised as follows: Section 2
provides a review of the most representative documents of the relia-
bility and vulnerability approaches. Section 3 describes the procedures
for evaluating the reliability and vulnerability of interconnected power
systems. Section 4 presents the case studies based on the IEEE RTS-96
test network and separately shows the numerical results of reliability
and vulnerability. Section 5 discusses the findings jointly, and Section 6
summarises the main conclusions of this work.
2. Reliability and vulnerability approaches
This section presents some important characteristics of the relia-
bility and vulnerability studies of power systems. These characteristics,
although not exhaustive, describe the fundamental principles involved
with each technique.
2.1. Evaluation of reliability
Reliability is the ability of a power grid to operate at the required
level of quality over a long period. The most analysed contingency
events are those that correspond to n-1 and n-2, which represent the
loss of one or two infrastructure assets, respectively. Reliability is
broken down into system adequacy and system security [14, 32].
System adequacy evaluates whether the capacity of energy generation
is adjusted to the demand and the limitations of the network in stable
conditions without contingencies. System security analyses the beha-
viour and performance of a network against the nontrivial loss of a
generator or transmission line. The purpose of the reliability analysis is
to describe the behaviour of the network and calculate indices that
describe intrinsic characteristics, such as energy not supplied, demand
not supplied, unmet demand, among others [13, 15]. The study per-
formed in this article focuses on the security of the system as related to
the performance of the interconnected network.
This type of evaluation can be performed from an analytical or si-
mulation perspective. The analytical technique represents the infra-
structure via analytical models and evaluates the indices using mathe-
matical solutions. This approach requires assumptions to simplify the
problem and produce an analytical model of the network so that the
resulting analysis may lose some or much of its meaning. The solution
using this technique is obtained in a relatively short time [14, 33, 34].
The Monte Carlo simulation technique estimates the reliability in-
dicators that simulate the process and random behaviour of the network
via experiments. Theoretically, this approach can take into account all
of the aspects and contingencies inherent to the planning, design and
operation of the infrastructure. These aspects include random events,
such as power outages and repairs of components constructed from
general probability distributions, component behaviours and power
variations [33, 34]. In general, the analytical technique is efficient
when the operating conditions are not complex, or the probability that
assets will fail are quite slim, and the Monte Carlo technique is pre-
ferable for complex operating conditions or a large number of events.
This latter approach is employed in this study for the reliability analysis
of the proposed case studies [33].
A reliability analysis based on the Monte Carlo simulation approach
generally employs two techniques: sequential and non-sequential. On
the one hand, the sequential technique simulates the real chronological
process and the random behaviour of the electrical infrastructure [33,
34]. This technique is performed by dividing the simulations into per-
iods and considering the contingencies produced in each case. The sets
of events are directly related to the previous simulation conditions. The
indicators are quantified when interruptions over one year are con-
sidered [15, 20]. On the other hand, the non-sequential technique
samples the system in such a way that each time step, system state or
failure event is considered independently, which produces a non-
chronological network state, i.e., less realistic state [33, 34]. This re-
search applies the sequential Monte Carlo simulation technique since it
is a more flexible and precise approach than the non-sequential tech-
nique in addition to representing a more realistic behaviour of the
coupled infrastructure.
2.2. Evaluation of vulnerability
The vulnerability of the power system has been a well-studied area
J. Beyza, et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 201 (2020) 106950
2
of research in the last decade. Despite being a common term, more than
twenty definitions of this concept are provided in the scientific litera-
ture [35]. Some authors suggest that vulnerability can involve social,
organisational, economic, environmental, territorial, physical and sys-
tematic aspects [36]. However, the majority of studies focus on sys-
tematic and physical vulnerabilities [36]. For this article, vulnerability
is an internal characteristic of electrical systems that is related to the
inability to withstand the effects of failures [37].
Vulnerability can be studied in two different ways: functional vul-
nerability and structural vulnerability. Functional vulnerability is re-
lated to the operational aspects and conditions of infrastructure, while
structural vulnerability is related to a decrease in the performance of a
network after a failure or event. For more information, consult [38].
The study of the impact of cross-border interconnections in inter-
connected power systems is carried out from the perspective of struc-
tural vulnerability, as it evaluates the combined performance of net-
works when they are subject to multiple n-k contingencies, i.e.,
cascading failures. The initial hypothesis of this study suggests that
cross-border connections can cause a decrease or drop in total network
performance as disturbances can propagate through these lines.
The assessment of vulnerability has many objectives according to
the uses of the researchers, such as identifying the critical components
that require protection, determining possible undesirable events, clas-
sifying the components according to their consequences, identifying
potential vulnerabilities, identifying existing countermeasures and es-
timating the degree of vulnerability of each component [14, 36, 39,
40]. This type of study, unlike the study of reliability, does not consider
the probabilities of failure of the elements; instead, it exhaustively
quantifies the impact caused in the topology by the systematic removal
of the assets. Contingency studies are among the criteria most employed
to evaluate the degree of impact of an event [41].
2.3. Discussion
Reliability and vulnerability studies of power networks are well-
documented approaches in the scientific literature. However, the se-
curity evaluation of cross-border interconnections in interconnected
electrical systems is a recent area of research with a lack of studies that
address both concepts in parallel. As a result, this study seeks to con-
tribute to bridging the gap to the apparent lack of related studies in this
field of research.
Interconnected electrical infrastructures are operated by different
independent Transmission System Operators (TSOs), who may unin-
tentionally perform actions that could damage network operation.
Therefore, the exchange of information should be considered when
analysing the joint vulnerability and reliability of networks [42].
The coupling of systems with different operational or topological
characteristics can drastically increase the joint vulnerability of the
networks, although from the point of view of reliability, improvements
are possible [43, 44]. For example, when two infrastructures of dif-
ferent sizes are coupled, larger networks may be less vulnerable than
small networks when few interconnections exist due to less propagation
of the disturbances of the other joint systems. Meanwhile, small net-
works can be more vulnerable than large networks when many inter-
connections exist due to the substantial difference in the scale of the
systems. Conversely, the interconnected systems would be much more
reliable from a reliability approach since the infrastructures would be
less sensitive to power outages caused by a malfunction. Both situations
shown here can compromise the coupling of power networks.
Vulnerability studies with the potential to identify and classify the
most severe failures or impacts can serve as a technique to determine
and optimise the best feeder links, improve the coupling of infra-
structure and mitigate undesirable events [45, 46].
Another essential aspect of recent consideration in the security of
interconnected systems is the constant occurrence of cyberattacks
against control systems. Vulnerability studies identify assets whose
destruction or weakening present an extremely high risk to the coupled
system [47, 48]. This approach also helps measure the evolution of
interconnected networks both before and after contingency events [49,
50]. In scientific literature, several traditional techniques for carrying
out these tasks are identified [51–53].
The combined analysis of the results of the reliability and vulner-
ability studies can offer a new perspective for evaluating the security of
cross-border interconnections since the information generated by both
approaches enables us to improve the understanding of these links. This
article provides new knowledge in this area of research.
3. Procedure to quantify the impacts of interconnections on
reliability and vulnerability
This section describes the methodology and statistical indicators
used to study the impact of cross-border interconnections on the re-
liability and vulnerability of coupled systems.
3.1. Methodology for the reliability calculation
The study of reliability requires the calculation of statistical in-
dicators to measure the efficiency of the electrical infrastructure. The
computation of these indicators is based on the frequency, duration,
and magnitude (or the probability) of adverse effects on the electric
supply. Regarding the security dimension of reliability, n-1 security
principle is usually employed [54]. This analysis aims to prevent
emergency conditions in the power grid, including the propagation of
incidents from one system to another [54]. Failure events are statisti-
cally independent, as asset disruptions are not related to other con-
tingencies occurring in another location in the network. This simulation
process realistically takes into account all aspects inherent in the design
and operation of the infrastructure. In this regard, TSOs have a variety
of indexes that allow them to measure the severity of a disruptive event
and to establish effective mitigation measures.
To calculate the security indicators, the sequential Monte Carlo
technique has an orderly procedure of steps that can be summarised as
follows [33, 34]:
Step 1. Determine the status of components susceptible to failures.
The two possible states of the assets of an electrical network are
normal or failure. Initially, all assets are assumed to be in a normal
state.
Step 2. Calculate the time the components spend in each state. The
time to failure (TTF) and time to repair (TTR) are calculated se-
quentially using the failure rates (λ), uniformly distributed random
numbers between [0,1] (r) and mean time to repair (MTTR) using
equations (1) and (2), respectively. The r-values are calculated using
congruential generators [33].
= ×rTTF ln( ) 8760 (1)
= ×rTTR ln( ) MTTR (2)
This step is repeated for a specific amount of time, usually one year.
Step 3. Provide the overlap times of the failures for an annual hor-
izon with an hourly resolution (8760 steps).
Step 4. Run optimal power flow study after a failure in the assets.
Step 5. Measure the reliability indicators in equations (3) through
(8) using the load flow results from step 4.
Expected energy not supplied [MWh/year]














where Ej, i is the energy not supplied (MW) to the electrical network in
the j-th power interruption in year i, Ny is the total number of years
simulated and Ni is the total number of interruptions in year i.
■ Expected demand not supplied [MW]
= EENSEDNS
8760 (4)
























where Dj, i is the duration of the j-th power interruption in year I
(hours).
■ Loss of load probability [%]
= LOLELOLP
8760 (7)
■ Loss of load duration [hours/disturbance]
= LOLELOLP
8760 (8)
Step 6. Repeat the previous steps until the EENS covariance index is
less than a predefined tolerance.
It should be noted that it is possible to take into account statistical
uncertainty in the input data when calculating the above indicators. For
this purpose, different probability functions associated with component
failure and restoration activities can be used. The objective is not only
to calculate reliability indices in the form of expected values of random
variables, but also the distributions of these indices. The most com-
monly used probability distributions are Weibull, normal and log-
normal [55]. This modified approach assumes that the components
have the same adjacent distribution and that the failure and repair
processes of the assets follow exponential distributions [56].
3.1.1. Plexos software
The Plexos software was used to develop the reliability studies in
the proposed cases, quantify the statistical indexes presented in the
previous point, and measure the impact of cross-border interconnec-
tions on the reliability of electrical networks. Plexos is a tool used to
model and plan electricity and gas markets that is widely used by the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) of Ireland and the California
Independent System Operator (CAISO), among many other public and
private organisations [29, 57, 58]. This software can calculate the re-
liability indices of LOLP, LOLE, EDNS and EENS from the PASA simu-
lation phase using convolution. However, it can also use the detailed
chronological simulation of ST Schedule to produce the same indicators
using Monte Carlo [59]. This latter approach is used in this article.
Although Plexos is a well-known software for conducting reliability
studies, this subsection illustrates the applicability of the program as an
accurate and efficient modelling tool.
For the case study, the well-known IEEE RTS-96 test network was
selected; its technical and operational characteristics are described in
detail in Appendix A [28], and the software was configured to perform
500 iterations using the sequential Monte Carlo technique with a pre-
set tolerance of 1.5%. The simulation data for each area can be found in
[15]. The results were compared with those reported in references [25]
and [32]. The programme was run on a personal computer with an
Intel® Core™ i5, 1.80 GHz CPU and 6 GB RAM. The simulation time was
8.43 hours.
Table 1 contains the results of the reliability indicators obtained in
this article in comparison with the results shown in references [6] and
[26]. As can be seen, the results calculated with the Plexos program
compare well with those reported in the references, indicating that the
model used provides results similar to those calculated with the tradi-
tional methods already known. This shows that the functional model
can be applied to the case studies presented in the following section.
3.2. Methodology for the vulnerability calculation
Structural vulnerability evaluates the physical characteristics of the
topology of the infrastructure when subjected to various n-k con-
tingencies. The aim is to prove whether cross-border interconnections
cause a decrease in network performance when disruptions propagate
through these links to the other interlinked systems.
3.2.1. Vulnerability metric
The appraisal of the performance of the interconnected infrastructures is
done through an index that quantifies the power supply during the disin-
tegration process. Similar to other studies [60–62], the load shedding (LS)
indicator is used to determine the effect of cascading failures on the coupled
network. The contingencies considered correspond to random events such
as component failures, protective devices malfunctions, and human errors
[63]. In this paper, cascading failures are successive events of faults in the
system's elements, even if the failed assets are not adjacent.










where PDiLC is the power load that remains electrically connected, fol-
lowing a node i disruption (MW), and PDiBC is the power load under the
base case (MW).
The LS metric varies between 1 and 0. Therefore, as the LS index
decreases or approaches zero, the impact on the entire infrastructure
increases. To calculate LS, a DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) study was
used, which considered the active power as the most important para-
meter [64].
3.2.2. Structural vulnerability algorithm
Algorithm 1 quantifies the impact of interconnections on inter-
connected power systems subject to multiple correlated n-k con-
tingencies. The procedure incorporates equation (9) depending on the
assets or elements eliminated. The algorithm begins by running a
DCOPF study to determine the total active power under the base case
Table 1
Comparison of the reliability results.
Index Reference [25] Reference [32] This article
Demand (MW) 2,850 2,850 2,850
EENS (MWh/year) 127,546 134,590 130,591
EENS (%) 0.51 0.54 0.52
EDNS (MW) 14.56 15.36 14.91
EFLC (outages/year) 18.8 18.57 18.59
LOLE (hours/year) 732 740.22 764.62
LOLP (%) 8.3 8.45 8.73
ADLC (hours/outage) 38.8 39.86 41.13
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and setting the LS index to 1, since =P PDiLC DiBC. Contingency events are
simulated by randomly eliminating buses and changing the topology
after each disruption. Due to the random nature of the results, a
threshold of experimental samples (Δ) is required to obtain an adequate
statistical sample, as reported in [65]. For each system studied, 1000
result samples were considered.
In addition, the bus removed is never the slack bus. This bus is not
removed because it is responsible for providing energy balances in the
flow equations. Although other buses can be chosen as references, this
is not done because the objective is to have a single measurement
network. The reason for this is that islands are generated during the
process of disintegrating the grid; therefore, it is necessary only to select
the subnet containing the slack bus. Algorithm 1 uses the Depth First
Search (DFS) algorithm to determine the islands in the network [66].
Then, DCOPF is only executed on the selected subnet to determine the
active power load that remains electrically connected, following the
removal of node i, i.e., PDiLC. The algorithm ends when no more assets
can be removed or if the sample threshold is reached.
4. Case studies
This section presents the case studies constructed from the IEEE
RTS-96 test network, from which seven different interconnected net-
works were extracted [28]. The reliability and vulnerability results for
each system studied are also reported.
4.1. Description of the case studies
The IEEE RTS-96 system is a good case study because it represents,
in real terms, a coupled infrastructure consisting of three identical
power systems [28]. Each electrical network consists of 24 buses, 32
generators and 38 power lines and transformers. This study considers a
failure rate of 0.001/year, a 24-hour MTTR and an annualised peak
power demand of 2850 MW in each infrastructure [15]. The technical
data of the network can be consulted in Appendix A [28].
This system has three equal areas that are connected as follows:
Area 1 is connected to Area 2 by three power transmission lines, Area 2
is connected to Area 3 by a transmission line, and Area 3 is connected to
Area 1 through an additional bus, an electric transformer and a trans-
mission line.
For simulation purposes, only Areas 1 and 2 (herein called Areas A
and B) with their three respective interconnecting links were con-
sidered, as shown in Fig. 1. By alternately combining the three inter-
connectors, seven different networks were extracted for analysis.
In isolated power systems, load shedding can occur when generation
does not meet the load demand. In interconnected power systems, this
deficiency can be met by exchanging power from other systems. This
support depends on the available capacity, the operational reserve, the
interconnection constraints and the type of agreement between the
infrastructures. That is, the capacity of the tie lines imposes limits on
assistance from one system to another — the above factor impact on the
reliability levels of the interconnected systems. Table 2 shows the sys-
tems studied, the interconnection lines considered, and the capacities of
the interconnection lines.
It should be noted that Network 1 consists of Areas A and B con-
nected with transmission lines[23-17],[13-15] and [07-03]. Network 2
also consists of Areas A and B, but they are connected with links [23-
17] and [13-15]. Networks 3 and 4 also connect the two areas with two
of the possible lines, while Networks 5 to 7 each use a single inter-
connector.
4.2. Effect of interconnections on reliability
Table 3 shows the reliability results of the different networks stu-
died using the Plexos software. Five hundred iterations are considered
for each system and covariance of less than 2%. Figure 2 shows the
convergence results of the EENS index when the sequential Monte Carlo
simulation technique is applied.
The results in Table 3 show that reliability improves as the number
of links between the systems increases. The best-case corresponds to the
interconnection of the two areas with three power lines (Network 1),
where the reliability improves by 71% compared to the isolated grid.
The values of the EENS metric (%) are better in the case of the
interconnected areas of the first six case studies, where small im-
provements are seen between the cases of Networks 1 to 6 as the
number and capacity of the interconnections increase. Thus, the
minimum EENS value is 0.151% in Network 1 compared to 0.164% in
Network 6.
However, the EENS is more than two times higher in the case of the
grid-connected with the line with the lower capacity [07-03] (Network
7) than in the other cases. Nevertheless, when the results of the system
for case 7 are compared with those shown in Table 1, which correspond
to an isolated grid, EENS decreases from 0.52% to 0.35%, which in-
dicates that a single interconnection line has the potential to improve
the reliability. The LOLP and LOLE indices have similar results.
Interconnections have an important role because they serve as
support elements between the different areas that make up an inter-
connected system. The efficient use of these connections is related to
the power that they can transmit to the joint systems. It is therefore
proposed to study this feature using the indicators of exchanged energy
(EE), maximum percentage of line capacity (MPLC) and percentage of
exchanged energy (PEE):
■ Exchanged energy [MWh/year]












where Ny is the total number of years simulated, L is the total
number of interconnections lines between areas, and F is the active
power.




where MLC is the maximum line capacity (MW) and NTC is the net
transfer capacity (MW).




These metrics are important for describing the contributions of the
connections. Table 4 shows the line loading of the interconnections for
the seven grids studied. It should be noted that Network 1 has the
highest annual PEE indicator, which implies that the use of the inter-
connections between highly connected grids is high. This means that
the higher the interconnection capacity is, the greater the power ex-
change between areas is. This benefits the systems because it facilitates
mutual support in case of contingencies.
Additionally, the EE results in Table 4 show that Area B strongly
supports Area A in all of the systems studied, which could be due to the
technical characteristics of the assets that work as an interconnection.
Furthermore, the MPLC results indicate that the capacity of the inter-
connection lines is sufficient: the busiest line corresponds to link [07-
03] in the case study of Network 7, which has an annual maximum
utilisation of 47.89% of its capacity, and the average of the remaining
lines is approximately 25%.
In short, interconnections increase the reliability of interconnected
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systems; however, the capacity of the links in the energy exchange and
the buses or assets selected as interconnecting elements should always
be considered.
4.3. Effect of interconnections on vulnerability
According to the methodology described in Section 3.2, the disin-
tegration of the systems was carried out by introducing random failures
and calculating the LS statistical indicator during the disintegration
process. The results were obtained by averaging 1000 simulation
samples for each infrastructure studied. When all of the buses are
initially connected, the LS index is equal to 1. Then, as the grid disin-
tegrates due to the propagation of cascading failures, the LS index de-
creases to 0, which means that the power supplies to all loads on the
grid have been interrupted. Figure 3 shows the performances of the
seven interconnected networks under cascading failures and the vul-
nerability curve of a separated Area A.
The results show that Area A initially collapses with the removal of
approximately 80% of the buses. In the remaining cases, the grids
disintegrate more quickly because the removal of 60-70% of the buses is
more than sufficient to cause a widespread blackout. Furthermore,
Fig. 1. Diagram of the IEEE RTS-96 test network.
Table 2
Topology and characteristics of the case studies.
Case studies Interconnection lines Capacity of the interconnection lines
(MW)
Network 1 [23-17], [13-15] y [07-
03]
608 + 608 + 208 = 1424 MW
Network 2 [23-17] y [13-15] 608 + 608 = 1216 MW
Network 3 [23-17] y [07-03] 608 + 208 = 816 MW
Network 4 [13-15] y [07-03] 608 + 208 = 816 MW
Network 5 [23-17] 608 MW
Network 6 [13-15] 608 MW
Network 7 [07-03] 208 MW
Table 3
Reliability results of the networks studied.
Network 1 Network 2 Network 3 Network 4 Network 5 Network 6 Network 7
Demand (MW) 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700 5700
EENS total (MWh/y) 75570.10 79647.85 78908.77 81611.48 81029.84 81851.03 173943.09
EENS (%) 0.151 0.160 0.158 0.163 0.162 0.164 0.348
EENS - Area A (MWh/y) 41169.40 45590.91 47585.95 55745.26 43969.82 50267.87 123024.73
EENS - Area B (MWh/y) 34175.35 34056.94 31322.82 34506.19 37060.02 31583.16 50918.36
EDNS (MW) 8.63 9.09 9.01 9.32 9.25 9.34 19.86
EFLC (outages/y) 29.93 29.85 29.15 30.23 29.66 30.27 38.7
LOLE (hours/y) 509.75 514.56 519.92 525.38 528.81 550.00 1137.01
LOLP (%) 5.82 5.87 5.94 6.00 6.04 6.28 12.98
ADLC (hours/outage) 17.03 17.24 17.84 17.38 17.83 18.17 29.38
COV EENS (%) 1.72 2.74 1.86 1.87 1.89 1.99 1.27
Computational time (hrs) 18.80 16.41 22.16 19.83 18.16 16.33 16.66
Fig. 2. Convergence of the Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS) index.
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when the cases linked by a single cross-border link (e.g., Network 5) are
considered, the vulnerability worsens significantly compared to the
separate case (Area A). However, by connecting the grids with two
links, such as Networks 2, 3 and 4, the infrastructure's vulnerability
begins to decrease because the disintegration process is slower. If a
third connecting link is added, the results do not improve significantly
because the structural performance never reaches the vulnerability le-
vels of the isolated power system.
A comparison of Figs. 3(a) and (b) shows that the network with
interconnections [23-17] and [13-15] provides the entire energy system
better efficiency compared to the network with interconnections [23-
17] and [07-03]. These empirical findings suggest that certain links
provide a more robust topological structure against the propagation of
cascading failures. For example, connecting two grids using links [23-
17], [13-15] and [07-03] does not significantly increase the vulner-
ability with respect to the separate system; however, if only the case
with link [07-03] is considered, the vulnerability increases dramatically
compared to the case described above.
In summary, the results show that interconnections have a sub-
stantial effect on the topology because they increase the propagation of
cascading events in interconnected systems. However, the number and
capacity of the interconnections are relevant to minimise the impact of
Table 4
Line loading of the interconnections.
NTC (MW) EE (MWh) Area A → Area B EE (MWh) Area B → Area A MLC (MW) MPLC (%) PEE (%)
Network 1 Total exchange 1424 57831.95 894754.01 254.58 17.88 1.90
23-17 608 28616.16 202139.35 94.98 15.62 0.46
13-15 608 72.76 625906.83 141.33 23.25 1.25
07-03 208 29143.03 66707.83 91.09 43.79 0.19
Network 2 Total exchange 1216 126739.90 368941.09 148.58 12.22 1.00
23-17 608 126119.28 31190.68 74.56 12.26 0.32
13-15 608 620.62 337750.41 99.64 16.39 0.68
Network 3 Total exchange 816 15266.05 702066.39 205.00 25.12 1.44
23-17 608 3697.23 508675.93 177.62 29.21 1.03
07-03 208 11568.82 193390.46 59.99 28.84 0.41
Network 4 Total exchange 816 15266.05 702066.39 205.00 25.12 1.44
13-15 608 2068.07 584605.87 169.34 27.85 1.17
07-03 208 39782.80 85156.14 53.73 25.83 0.25
Network 5 23-27 608 130260.68 161135.52 145.53 23.94 0.58
Network 6 13-15 608 54353.14 286926.95 162.76 26.77 0.68
Network 7 07-03 208 188340.70 34488.39 99.62 47.89 0.45
Fig. 3. Structural vulnerability results.
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the propagation of grid disruptions. The findings obtained here suggest
similar conclusions to those shown in the papers [43] and [44].
5. Discussion of results
This study shows that reliability and vulnerability assessments are
useful tools for TSOs to understand the performance and limitations of
their critical infrastructure better. Therefore, this section focuses on the
comparison and discussion of both approaches.
Until now, the two techniques have been used to analyse and ex-
amine different aspects of networks; however, this article considers that
both approaches can be used in combination to provide a broader view
of the operational performance of power systems.
The reliability results were obtained through statistical indicators
that describe the operating conditions of the grid after an n-1 con-
tingency, and the vulnerability results were plotted as decay curves that
represent the topological behaviour of the studied systems against n-k
contingencies. Therefore, it is proposed to determine damage areas
(DAs) to accurately assess the performance of the decay curves of each
result in Fig. 3. DA is defined as the region under the cascading failures
curve [67]. This metric is calculated as follows:
1 Determine the equations f(x) of the decay curves.
2 Calculate the integral of the equations using the fraction of removed
buses as the minimum and maximum limits.
Curves near the abscissa represent greater damage to the infrastructure;
thus, a small DA represents a case of severe damage, which coincides with a
smaller area under the curve. Conversely, higher DA values represent less
severe scenarios for the system. The use of this metric allows vulnerability
indicator to be compared with reliability indicators.
Figure 4 compares the EENS (%) reliability indicators from Table 3
and the vulnerability values obtained from the plots in Fig. 3. First, the
vulnerability results show that isolated systems (Area A) are more ro-
bust than interconnected grids. The isolated system (Area A) has a DA
value of 35, which is significantly better than the vulnerability in-
dicators for the other case studies corresponding to the interconnection
of the two areas, which have DA values between 24 and 31. Specifi-
cally, cross-border interconnections can increase the impact of a dis-
turbance on the vulnerability of the entire power system. Of all the
cases analysed, the smallest loss of robustness is achieved in the case
study of Network 1, i.e., when there is greater interconnection capacity
between the two areas (through lines [23-17], [13-15] and [07-03]).
Therefore, the reliability results show that interconnected systems
are more reliable than isolated systems. The information in Table 2
shows that the most interconnected case (Network 1) is less sensitive to
power outages caused by a malfunction; it is more reliable. In addition,
the least connected infrastructure, which is Network 7, has a higher
Expected Energy Not Supplied indicator (EENS); however, this case still
has better reliability than the case of the isolated grid of Area A (see
EENS results in Table 1).
A joint analysis of the vulnerability and reliability indicators shown
in Fig. 4 shows that Networks 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 have small differences in
both vulnerability and reliability. These cases represent a compromise
solution for the design of interconnections between power systems, so
the final design will only depend on the requirements of energy ex-
change to improve the system adequacy of the joint system (Network 1
offers an interconnection capacity of 1424 MW, Network 2 of 1216
MW, Network 3 and 4 of 816 MW, Network 6 of 608 MW). However,
Networks 5 and 7 are characterised by lower robustness against cas-
cading failures, and Network 7 (which corresponds to the inter-
connection of the two areas with a single low-capacity line [07-03]) has
the worst reliability and the worst vulnerability of all the cases studied.
In contrast, the best results for both indicators are obtained in
Network 1, which indicates that when it is necessary to connect elec-
trical systems with cross-border lines to improve the security of supply,
a greater interconnection capacity helps to improve the reliability and
also provides the smallest loss of robustness in the interconnected
power system.
6. Conclusions
In this article, the impacts of cross-border electricity interconnec-
tions on the reliability and vulnerability of interconnected power sys-
tems were studied. The reliability assessment was carried out by
quantifying the main traditional indicators, while the vulnerability as-
sessment was performed by considering a process of cascading failures
and measuring the energy not supplied during the grid disintegration
process. Both approaches were used in a comprehensive study frame-
work that considered the fundamental specifications of their respective
research fields. The simulation case studies corresponded to seven dif-
ferent systems obtained from the IEEE RTS-96 network.
The results showed that interconnections increase the reliability but
also decrease the robustness of the entire system. This means that
connection lines improve the energy exchange between the different
areas that make up an interconnected infrastructure and simultaneously
increase the probability that disruptions in one of the systems propa-
gate to the others. In that case, having greater interconnection capacity
is the best compromise solution for the design of transmission network
topologies under reliability and robustness criteria. Thus,
Fig. 4. Comparison between the reliability (100-EENS (%)) and vulnerability (DA) indicators.
J. Beyza, et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 201 (2020) 106950
8
interconnected energy systems behave differently depending on how
they are studied; however, the results obtained here could help TSOs to
study the interconnection of two or more grids from a more compre-
hensive point of view.
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Appendix A
This appendix provides the technical data of the IEEE RTS-96 test network. The information is taken from [28]. Tables A.1–A.6
Table A.1
IEEE RTS-96 Bus Data
Bus Bus Load GL BL Area Base Zone
Type MW MVAr kV
101, 201 2 108 22 0 0 11 138 11
102, 202 2 97 20 0 0 11 138 12
103, 203 1 180 37 0 0 11 138 11
104, 204 1 74 15 0 0 11 138 11
105, 205 1 71 14 0 0 11 138 11
106, 206 1 136 28 0 1.00 11 138 12
107, 207 2 125 25 0 0 11 138 12
108, 208 1 171 35 0 0 11 138 12
109, 209 1 175 36 0 0 11 138 13
110, 210 1 195 40 0 0 11 138 13
111, 211 1 0 0 0 0 11 230 13
112, 212 1 0 0 0 0 11 230 13
113, 213 3 265 54 0 0 12 230 14
114, 214 2 194 39 0 0 12 230 16
115, 215 2 317 64 0 0 12 230 16
116, 216 2 100 20 0 0 12 230 16
117, 217 1 0 0 0 0 12 230 17
118, 218 2 333 68 0 0 12 230 17
119, 219 1 181 37 0 0 12 230 15
120, 220 1 128 26 0 0 12 230 15
121, 221 2 0 0 0 0 12 230 17
122, 222 2 0 0 0 0 12 230 17
123, 223 2 0 0 0 0 12 230 15
124, 224 1 0 0 0 0 12 230 16
Note: Area A (Buses 101-124) and Area B (Buses 201-224); Bus Type: 1 (Load), 2 (Generator), 3 (Slack); GL: real component of shunt admittance; and BL: imaginary
component of shunt admittance.
Table A.2
Bus load data.
Bus number % of system load Load
MW
101, 201 3.8 108
102, 202 3.4 97
103, 203 6.3 180
104, 204 2.6 74
105, 205 2.5 71
106, 206 4.8 136
107, 207 4.4 125
108, 208 6.0 171
109, 209 6.1 175
110, 210 6.8 195
113, 213 9.3 265
114, 214 6.8 194
115, 215 11.1 317
116, 216 3.5 100
118, 218 11.7 333
119, 219 6.4 181
120, 220 4.5 128
100 2850



















U12 12 Oil/Steam 0.02 2940 60 2
U20 20 Oil/CT 0.10 450 50 2
U50 50 Hydro 0.01 1980 20 2
U76 76 Coal/Steam 0.02 1960 40 3
U100 100 Oil/Steam 0.04 1200 50 3
U155 155 Coal/Steam 0.04 960 40 4
U197 197 Oil/Steam 0.05 950 50 4
U350 350 Coal/Steam 0.08 1150 100 5
U400 400 Nuclear 0.12 1100 150 6
Table A.4
Data of generators at each bus.
Bus Unit ID Pg Qg Qmax Qmin Vs
101, 201 U20 1 10 0 10 0 1.035
101, 201 U20 2 10 0 10 0 1.035
101, 201, U76 3 76 14.1 30 -25 1.035
101, 201 U76 4 76 14.1 30 -25 1.035
102, 202 U20 1 10 0 10 0 1.035
102, 202 U20 2 10 0 10 0 1.035
102, 202 U76 3 76 7.0 30 -25 1.035
102, 202 U76 4 76 7.0 30 -25 1.035
107, 207 U100 1 80 17.2 60 0 1.025
107, 207 U100 2 80 17.2 60 0 1.025
107, 207 U100 3 80 17.2 60 0 1.025
113, 213 U197 1 95.1 40.7 80 0 1.020
113, 213 U197 2 95.1 40.7 80 0 1.020
113, 213 U197 3 95.1 40.7 80 0 1.020
114, 214 Sync Cond 1 0 13.7 200 -50 0.980
115, 215 U12 1 12 0 6 0 1.014
115, 215 U12 2 12 0 6 0 1.014
115, 215 U12 3 12 0 6 0 1.014
115, 215 U12 4 12 0 6 0 1.014
115, 215 U12 5 12 0 6 0 1.014
115, 215 U155 6 155 0.05 80 -50 1.014
116, 216 U155 1 155 25.22 80 -50 1.017
118, 218 U400 1 400 137.4 200 -50 1.050
121, 221 U400 1 400 108.2 200 -50 1.050
122, 222 U50 1 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
122, 222 U50 2 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
122, 222 U50 3 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
122, 222 U50 4 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
122, 222 U50 5 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
122, 222 U50 6 50 -4.96 16 -10 1.050
123, 223 U155 1 155 31.79 80 -50 1.050
123, 223 U155 2 155 31.79 80 -50 1.050
123, 223 U350 3 350 71.78 150 -25 1.050
Note: Vs is the unit's regulated voltage set-point.
Table A.5













U12 12 Oil/Steam 2 4 1
U20 20 Oil/CT 1 1 3
U50 50 Hydro N/A
U76 76 Coal/Steam 4 8 2
U100 100 Oil/Steam 8 8 7
U155 155 Coal/Steam 8 8 3
U197 197 Oil/Steam 10 12 3
U350 350 Coal/Steam 48 24 4
U400 400 Nuclear 1 1 20




ID From To L λp Dur. λt R X B Con. LTE STE Tr.
A1 101 102 3 0.24 16 0.0 0.003 0.014 0.461 175 193 200 0
A2 101 103 55 0.51 10 2.9 0.055 0.211 0.057 175 208 220 0
A3 101 105 22 0.33 10 1.2 0.022 0.085 0.023 175 208 220 0
A4 102 104 33 0.39 10 1.7 0.033 0.127 0.034 175 208 220 0
A5 102 106 50 0.48 10 2.6 0.050 0.192 0.052 175 208 220 0
A6 103 109 31 0.38 10 1.6 0.031 0.119 0.032 175 208 220 0
A7 103 124 0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 510 600 1.015
A8 104 109 27 0.36 10 1.4 0.027 0.104 0.028 175 208 220 0
A9 105 110 23 0.34 10 1.2 0.023 0.088 0.024 175 208 220 0
A10 106 110 16 0.33 35 0.0 0.014 0.061 2.459 175 193 200 0
A11 107 108 16 0.30 10 0.8 0.016 0.061 0.017 175 208 220 0
AB1 107 203 42 0.44 10 2.2 0.042 0.161 0.044 175 208 220 0
A12-1 108 109 43 0.44 10 2.3 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 208 220 0
A13-2 108 110 43 0.44 10 2.3 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 208 220 0
A14 109 111 0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 510 600 1.030
A15 109 112 0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 510 600 1.030
A16 110 111 0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 510 600 1.015
A17 110 112 0 0.02 768 0.0 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 510 600 1.015
A18 111 113 33 0.40 11 0.8 0.006 0.048 0.100 500 600 625 0
A19 111 114 29 0.39 11 0.7 0.005 0.042 0.088 500 600 625 0
A20 112 113 33 0.40 11 0.8 0.006 0.048 0.100 500 600 625 0
A21 112 123 67 0.52 11 1.6 0.012 0.097 0.203 500 600 625 0
A22 113 123 60 0.49 11 1.5 0.011 0.087 0.182 500 600 625 0
AB2 113 215 52 0.47 11 1.3 0.010 0.075 0.158 500 600 625 0
A23 114 116 27 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.059 0.082 500 600 625 0
A24 115 116 12 0.33 11 0.3 0.002 0.017 0.036 500 600 625 0
A25-1 115 121 34 0.41 11 0.8 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 600 625 0
A25-2 115 121 34 0.41 11 0.8 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 600 625 0
A26 115 124 36 0.41 11 0.9 0.007 0.052 0.109 500 600 625 0
A27 116 117 18 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 600 625 0
A28 116 119 16 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.023 0.049 500 600 625 0
A29 117 118 10 0.32 11 0.2 0.002 0.014 0.030 500 600 625 0
A30 117 122 73 0.54 11 1.8 0.014 0.105 0.221 500 600 625 0
A31-1 118 121 18 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 600 625 0
A31-2 118 121 18 0.35 11 0.4 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 600 625 0
A32-1 119 120 27.5 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.040 0.083 500 600 625 0
A32-2 119 120 27.5 0.38 11 0.7 0.005 0.040 0.083 500 600 625 0
A33-1 120 123 15 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 600 625 0
A33-2 120 123 15 0.34 11 0.4 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 600 625 0
A34 121 122 47 0.45 11 1.2 0.009 0.068 0.142 500 600 625 0
AB3 123 217 51 0.46 11 1.3 0.010 0.074 0.155 500 600 625 0
Note: ID (Branch identifier. Inter area branches are indicated by double letter ID); λP (Permanent outage rate [outage/year]); Dur. (Permanent outage duration [hrs]);
λt (Transient outage rate [outages/year]); Con. (Continuous rating); LTE (Long-time emergency rating [24 hrs]); STE (Short-time emergency rating [15 min]); Tr.
(Transformer off-nominal ratio).
Algorithm 1
. Quantification of the effect of interconnections on the vulnerability of power grids.
Input: Information about the power grid and Δ.
Output: LS.
Step 1: Initialization: n=1, LS=1, =N NBuses ; set the sample threshold Δ;
Step 2: Power flows calculation: use DCOPF to calculate the load flows in the system;
calculate Pi Di
BC for the base case;
Step 3: Starting point: randomly select a bus of the system as the first node to be
eliminated (Neliminated ≠ Bslack);
Step 4: New topology: eliminate all links adjacent to the node removed in Step 3;
determine the number of islands and identify the island that contains the slack
generator;
Step 5: Power flows calculation: run DCOPF on the network from Step 4;
Step 6: LS calculation: use equation (9) and calculate the LS x( )Neliminated
n of the grid
that corresponds to node Neliminated of sample n at the x-th contingency;
Step 7: New node selection: randomly eliminate a new node from the network from
Step 4 if ∑Neliminated < N and go to Step 4; otherwise, go to Step 8;
Step 8: Set = +n n 1;
Step 8: Ending: if n > Δ, the algorithm ends; otherwise, go to Step 1;
Step 9: Results: Average the LS results of all Δ samples.
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